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Fragmentation of international law is a phenomenon that has been discussed ever 
since the ILC in 2000 decided to add to its programme of work the topic ‘Risks 
ensuing from the fragmentation of international law’.1 Koskenniemi, in a paper 
published in this Journal, was one of the first to address fragmentation in legal 
literature. 2  In 2006, he finalized a voluminous Report on ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law’, providing for means and ways to cope with fragmentation.3  
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals sparked this debate 
over fragmentation.4 The development of a specialist regime of international law was 
perceived as posing a risk to the coherence and homogeneity of international law. 
Much of the anxiety over fragmentation stems from the collision between the ICJ and 
the ICTY over the ‘overall control-test’ in Tadic where the ICTY departed from settled 
ICJ law on attribution of liability and on qualification of the nature of an armed 
conflict (employing a standard of ‘effective control’).5 The fact that that the ICTY had 
earlier referred to itself as a ‘self-contained’ system6, fuelled these concerns over 
fragmentation.  
At the same time, the anxiety over fragmentation has been trivialized. 
Koskeniemmi and Leino point out that, 
 
[i]nternational lawyers have always had to cope with the absence of a single source of normative 
validity, it may seem paradoxical that they should now feel anxiety about competing normative 
orders.7 
 
Moreover, Simma in his keynote speech to the ESIL conference in 2008 expressed the 
view that the dangers of fragmentation are overstated. In his view, the emergence of 
international courts and tribunals does not pose challenges to the coherence of the 
international legal system since international judges are aware of the responsibility 
they bear for a coherent construction of international law.8  
Twenty years since the establishment of the ICTY, the 
fragmentation/heterogeneity debate has entered a new phase. With a well-	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developed body of ad hoc Tribunal case law, an emerging body of case law at the 
ICC, hybrid systems like the Cambodia Tribunal, and more and more domestic 
prosecutions, pluralism has become an issue within the branch of ICL. While there 
are those who express concern over heterogeneity in ICL, recent scholarship 
acknowledges ICL’s pluralistic nature and, instead of striving for unity, calls for 
ways of managing pluralism.9  In a recent paper on pluralism in international 
criminal law, Alexander Greenawalt argues that the search for consistency and 
uniformity is misguided.10 He acknowledges that ICL “operates in an irreducibly 
pluralistic environment” and that the law applicable to international crimes “should 
not be the same in all cases”.11 
 
Heterogeneity  
 
International criminal courts create distinct legal spaces. They each have their own 
Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and specific context in which they operate. 
Stahn and Van den Herik distinguish three models of international criminal justice: 
ad hoc justice, hybrid courts and the statutory regime of the Rome.12 Just like the ICTY 
in Tadic compartmentalized the law on attribution and the determination of armed 
conflicts by adopting its ‘own’ (overall) control- test, international criminal justice 
systems compartmentalize ICL by creating separate legal regimes. The ICC most 
prominently features as a separate legal system. This is due to its institutional layout, 
in particular its approach to sources of law, but also to its legal culture.  
Unlike article 38 of the ICJ Statute, Article 21 of the ICC Statute creates a 
hierarchy of sources13 The Statute, the Elements of Crime and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence are the primary sources. Applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law come second. General principles derived from national law 
come third. Customary international law is not specifically mentioned in Article 21 
but it may be applied under the heading ‘rules of international law’ in Article 
21(1)(b).14  
Article 21(2) authorizes the ICC to apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in its previous decisions. While this text clearly applies to case law of the 
Court it cannot be taken to mean that – a contrario – Article 21(2) prohibits the 
importation of principles derived from the case law of other international courts.15 
Yet, the ICC, by referring to the provisions of its Statute, can justifiably ignore the 
precedents of these courts.16	  Article 21 –	  at	  least	  on	  paper	  –	  limits	  the	  room	  for judicial 
development.17 It is the hierarchical position of written, statutory law and the 
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fertilization. According to Cryer Article 21 contributes to the fragmentation of ICL.18 
It is also the ICC’s culture that betrays Alleingang. There has been resistance 
at the Court to apply principles drawn from ad hoc Tribunals’ law, even when there 
was no provision in the Statute requiring a departure from ICTY/R precedents. 
Examples concern procedural and substantive law. With regard to the former we can 
refer to the debate on ‘witness proofing’.19 With regard to the latter we can point to 
the ‘control of the act/crime’ theory of liability. 20  Both developments illustrate the 
Court’s desire to move away from ICTY/R legacy and to forge its own path. The ICC 
is – to use Simma’s wording – a separate epistemic community of highly specialized 
lawyers who, as if in a laboratory, seek to improve and further develop ICL.21 This 
can be regarded as a process of emancipation, which results in creating something 
close to a self-contained regime.  
Heterogeneity in ICL is further reinforced by domestic courts when acting 
as law-enforces of ICL whether it is on the basis of universal jurisdiction, 
pursuant to the ICC’s complementarity-regime, or by operating through classical 
principles of jurisdiction, such as territoriality and nationality. Domestic courts 
may look to international jurisprudence for guidance but they are not obliged to 
apply law emanating from international courts or tribunals. While 
complementarity and universal jurisdiction may prompt national jurisdictions to 
align to, or even incorporate the (exact) definitions of international crimes, the 
general part of criminal law and sentencing is generally regarded as belonging to 
the domestic domain.22 It is here that we can expect divergence.23 Indeed, ICL at 
the national level constitutes a patchwork of norms; it is as diverse as the number 
of jurisdictions that act as law-enforcers. Domestic law multiplies and reinforces 
what is already a heterogeneous legal order.  
 
 
Legal Pluralism 
 
When discussing heterogeneity in ICL, pluralism should be favoured as a term over 
fragmentation. Fragmentation has a negative connotation.24 Heterogeneity in ICL is a 
reality and by recognizing the pluralist nature of ICL one can think of how to 
manage it rather then how to counter it. Legal pluralism can even be regarded an 
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Instead of being undermined by fragmentation, the rules of, the institutions, and practices of the 
international legal order can be strengthened by the emergence of an international legal pluralism. 25 
 
For pluralism to strengthen the international criminal justice order, courts need to 
engage in a judicial dialogue rather than in Alleingang.26 Pauwelyn’s metaphor of a 
universe of inter-connected islands comes to mind when viewing pluralism in ICL.27  
Griffiths in 1986 defined pluralism as, “[t]hat state of affairs, for any social 
field, in which behaviour pursuant to more than one legal order occurs”.28 The 
debate on legal pluralism originates in the field of anthropology and law, where 
pluralism was discussed in association with colonialism. 29  Pluralism was a 
phenomenon relating to legal and quasi-legal regimes in the post-colonial society 
where different bodies of (quasi-) law were applied to different groups of the 
population. With the proliferation of transnational and international legal regimes, 
pluralism has become a phenomenon that belongs to the transnational-regional and 
global legal context.30  
Pluralism connotes overlapping, not necessarily conflicting, legal regimes. In 
the area of ICL, it confronts both international and domestic judges. When the latter 
act as international law-enforcers they may have to answer the question of, for 
instance, which law to apply when interpreting the definition of crimes against 
humanity: ICC law or ICTY law? International judges encounter legal pluralism as 
long as they operate in a ‘state of connectedness’ and see themselves as part of a 
larger system of international criminal justice. A typical question of legal pluralism 
(and judicial dialogue) could be: can ICTY law on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) be 
relied upon when interpreting Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute?  
 
 
Universality 
 
Pluralism does not exclude universality. To the contrary, pluralism implies 
universality and a certain degree of ‘commonness’. In pluralism-literature, different 
forms of universality are recognized. Universality can be found in a common core of 
norms that are universal in application. Universality can go further and foster a belief 
in universal values (bordering on religious belief).31 Either way - universality in 
application or universal in value - with a core of universal norms, pluralism takes the 
shape of legal systems gravitating around a common core, like planets circling 
around the sun. Universality can also be a narrative; an antidote to heterogeneity and 
an attempt to erase normative differences.32 This is where universality prompts legal 
systems to connect and engage in judicial dialogue. Here the island-metpahor comes 
to mind. Pluralism is confined by a shared belief in functioning within a broader 
structure or system of law, like island belonging to one and the same Archipelago. 
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Simma discerns three levels of universality in international law.33 The first 
goes to the universality of international norms. This ‘classic’ understanding of 
universality  means that there exists on the global scale an international law which is 
valid for and binding on all states. A second – wider - level of universality goes to the 
coherence of the international justice system. Here concerns of predictability and 
legal certainty drive a quest for some form of constituted organized whole. A third 
level pertains to the (perceived) universal nature of an international system, 
expressing the conviction that it is possible and even desirable to establish a legal 
order at an international or global scale, a “common legal order for mankind as a 
whole”.  
The first level of Simma’s scheme corresponds to universality as a common 
core where pluralism consists of legal systems gravitating around a common core 
(planet-metaphor). Simma’s second level corresponds to universality as a shared 
belief of functioning within a larger legal system where pluralism consists of legal 
systems that are connected in an interjudicial dialogue (island-metaphor). The third 
level may be seen as a combination of the two forms of universality, where a belief in 
universal values reinforces the pull for further integration and the erosion of 
normative differences.   
We can translate Simma’s strata or layers of universality to the subsystem of 
ICL. In ICL, the common core consists of a number of (ius cogens) norms, e.g. crime 
definitions (genocide and grave breaches of international humanitarian law) and  
non-derogable human rights/due process norms (presumption of innocence, 
prohibition of torture). The second level of universality consists of cross-fertilization 
and judicial dialogue between international tribunals inter se and between domestic 
judges and international judges, with the former seeking guidance by the latter. The 
third level pertains to the quest for a comprehensive and unified international 
criminal law, a general part of ICL. 
 
  
Need for a General Part? 
 
It has been argued, mainly by criminal law scholars coming from the civil law 
tradition, that there is need for a ‘general part’ in international criminal law. It is felt 
that in order to be coherent international criminal law must consist, not only of a 
special part, which contains the definitions of international crimes, but also of a 
general part on aspects of mens rea, modalities of criminal responsibility, and 
justifications and excuses.  
Greenawalt criticizes this quest for a general part of ICL. Not merely because, 
he thinks it unfeasible, more so because he finds it wrong in principle. He argues that 
the drive towards unification and consistency at the international level creates 
fracture and inconsistency at the national level, which can threaten the integrity of a 
state’s criminal justice system. The creation of a distinct system of ICL may cause a 
state to adopt liability principles that are inconsistent with those otherwise applied. 34 
A uniform code of ICL could cause pluralism at the national level. 
And here we encounter a question that shimmers through the debate on 
pluralism and universality: are international crimes fundamentally different from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Simma,	  supra	  footnote	  8,	  266-­‐268.	  34	  That	   this	   is	   a	   real	   risk	   can	   be	   taken	   from	   the	   Van	   Anraat	   case	   in	   The	   Netherlands:	   Judgement,	   Van	  
Anraat,	  Hague	  District	  Court,	  Case	  No.	  LJN:	  AU8685,	  23	  December	  2005;	   Judgement,	  Van	  Anraat,	  Hague	  Court	  of	  Appeals,	  Case	  No.	  LJN:	  BA4676,	   ILDC	  (International	  Law	  in	  Domestic	  Courts)	  753	  (NL	  2007),	  9	  May	  2007,	  at	  7.	  See	  H.G.	  van	  der	  Wilt,	   ‘Genocide	  v.	  War	  Crimes	   in	  the	  Van	  Anraat	  Appeal’,	  6	   JICJ	   (2009),	  557-­‐567;	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ordinary crimes? Does international criminality qualify as sui generis and hence 
require the existence of its own general part, generating a two-track system of 
adjudication at the national level: one for domestic/ordinary crimes and one for 
international crimes? Greenawalt examines the alleged international/sui generis 
nature of ICL and the arguments that are relied upon to justify the development of a 
general part of ICL. 35He discusses justifications rooted in international relations, 
gravity considerations, and enforcement concerns. None of these considerations 
persuade him to accept a general part of ICL to the detriment of domestic law.  
Unlike Greenawalt, I would argue in favour of developing a uniform, or at 
least harmonized, core of substantive international criminal law. Accepting pluralism 
at the national level does not disqualify the need for a general part at the international 
level. Substantive international criminal law is under-theorized and lacks a common 
‘grammar’. Moreover, certain liability theories have developed as genuine, sui generis 
international liability theories (JCE, command responsibility) that could be 
implemented at the national level along-side local law that traditionally forms part of 
the domestic general part (complicity liability, defences, sentencing). Developing an 
international general part will contribute towards a more sophisticated substantive 
international criminal law, especially when drawn on (general) principles of time-
honoured domestic criminal law. In doing so, one must adopt a harmonizing 
approach. By looking beyond labels and concepts differences may be minimized to 
allow for developing an international theory of attribution. Such an approach may 
have an added value in that it stays the current trend of Alleingang at the 
international level.  
 
 
Managing Pluralism  
 
Having argued that pluralism is not something to counter but rather to manage, we 
turn to the mechanisms that have been identified to deal with legal pluralism. 
Berman surveys a series of mechanisms, institutions and practices that are used to 
accommodate and manage legal pluralism. They are, i) dialectical legal dialogue (ii) 
margins of appreciation (iii) limited autonomy regimes (iv) subsidiarity schemes (v) 
jurisdictional redundancies (multiple and overlapping jurisdictional assertions 
reinforcing a particular claim), (vi) hybrid participation arrangements (vii) mutual 
recognition schemes (viii) safe harbour agreements and (ix) a pluralist approach to 
conflict of laws. A discussion of all nine mechanisms would go beyond the ambit of 
this editorial. I wish to make only a few observations.  
Two ICL ‘phenomena’ are expressly mentioned in Berman’s scheme: hybrid 
adjudication/participation (under vi) and complementarity (under v). Hybrid 
participation has a long history and goes back to the 12th century and the English 
custom of using mixed juries with members of different communities 
accommodating regional differences.36 The SCSL and other hybrid courts like the 
ECCC exemplify pluralism; they are an expression of the belief that not one set of 
norms applies to the crimes committed in Sierra Leone and Cambodia respectively.  
Complementarity is grouped under Berman’s category of jurisdictional 
redundancies: 
 
Complementarity regimes are a more formalized way of harnessing the potential power of 
jurisdictional redundancy. Here the idea is that when two legal communities claim jurisdiction over 
an actor, one community agrees not to assert jurisdiction, but only so long as the other community 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  See	  supra	  footnote	  11,	  21-­‐37	  36	  Berman,	  supra	  footnote	  30,	  at	  1218-­‐1219	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takes action. This is a hybrid mechanism because one community does not hierarchically impose a 
solution on the other, but it does assert influence on the other's domestic process through its mere 
presence as a potential jurisdictional actor in the future. (…)  
The best-known complementarity regime in the world today is the one enshrined in the statute of the 
International Criminal Court ("ICC").37 
In this context, complementarity encompasses the belief that there is not one legal 
framework that applies to international crimes.38 This is an interesting observation 
when we bear in mind that complementarity has also been perceived as pushing for 
exactly the opposite: uniformity. 
Berman’s scheme further refers to judicial dialogue as a mechanism to manage 
pluralism (under i)). Indeed, this is one of the most important ‘tools’ to stay 
fragmentation and it has been recognized as such by legal scholars in the field.39  
An interesting and possibly useful mechanism of pluralism-management in 
Berman’s list is the category of ‘safe harbour agreements’, which partly overlaps with 
mechanism (ii) margins of appreciation. 
 
Instead of full harmonization of norms, safe harbour principles require that firms doing business 
abroad abide by some, though not all, of the standards of that foreign community. In return, the 
foreign community agrees not to impose further regulatory burdens.40 
 
Translated to ICL this would mean that domestic courts, when acting as international 
law enforces, can rely on their domestic general part when adjudicating international 
crimes. For the interpretation of crime definitions and a limited number of sui generis 
liability theories, however, they should apply international norms. It is only the 
general part that remains in the domestic sphere.  
A tool, mentioned earlier in the context of the quest for a general part, that is 
not mentioned in Berman’s list of pluralism-management, is harmonization. In 
Berman’s paper harmonization belongs to the universalist pole rather than to the 
realm of pluralism. This betrays a somewhat ‘negative’ view of pluralism. Viewed in 
a more positive light: pluralism as an asset that strengthens rather than weakens the 
international criminal justice system, accepts some form of harmonization. Bearing in 
mind how pluralism and universality belong together and retaining ICL’s balance 
between universality and fragmentation, requires in my view that a common core of 
substantive law is harmonized. 
 
This brings me back to Greenawalt who concludes his paper on pluralism by 
characterizing ICL as a four-tier system rather than a single universal code.41 He 
distinguishes between (1) universally binding law (2) tribunal-specific law (3) 
restraints on domestic law (4) default law. Every tier or category of law comes with 
its own gradation of pluralism (in the sense of more or less pluralism) and hence 
constitutes a way to manage pluralism.  
In Greenawalt’s four-tier system we recognize some of the above-mentioned 
pluralism-management tools, most notably the safe harbour agreements and margins 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Berman,	  supra	  footnote	  30,	  at	  1215.	  38	  Consider	  also	  Art.	  10	  ICC	  Statute:	  Nothing	  in	  this	  Part	  shall	  be	  interpreted	  as	  limiting	  or	  prejudicing	  in	  any	  way	  existing	  or	  developing	  rules	  of	  international	  law	  for	  purposes	  other	  than	  this	  Statute.	  39	  Burke-­‐White,	   supra	   footnote	   25,	   at	   971-­‐973;	   See	   also	   W.W.	   Burke-­‐White,	   ‘A	   Community	   of	   Courts:	  Toward	   a	   System	   of	   International	   Criminal	   Law	   Enforcement,	   24	   Mich	   J	   Int’l	   L	   1	   (2002);	   See	   A-­‐M.	  Slaughter,	  A	  New	  World	  Order	   (2004),	  250;	  A-­‐M.	   Slaughter,	   ‘Judicial	  Globalization’,	   40	  Va.	  J.	   Int’l	  L	   1103,	  1105-­‐1116.	  40	  Berman,	  supra	  footnote	  30,	  at	  1228.	  41	  Greenawalt,	  supra	  footnote	  11,	  59-­‐66.	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of appreciation. The first tier of ICL contains ‘hard’ rules that are universal in 
application, e.g. crime definitions. The second tier relates to so-called forum-specific 
norms, e.g. distinct rules of procedure and evidence. The third category of ICL 
concerns the general part of domestic law where ICL, rather than imposing a single 
uniform approach, allows and constrains a “margin of state discretion to apply local 
law to the prosecution of ICL offences”.42 The fourth tier consists of ‘default ICL’ in 
case there is no appropriate or available domestic law to apply. Taken together the 
four tiers allow for legal pluralism with the 2nd and 3rd tier expressly allowing for 
pluralism at both the international and domestic level. Universality is found in the 
core of universally binding law. Greenawalt’s four-tier system is a first attempt to 
comprehensively deal with pluralism in substantive ICL.  
Pluralism in ICL is a topic that warrants further research and debate, by both 
scholars and legal practitioners. With the growing density and activity of ICL, legal 
pluralism will only become more prominent. This Journal has accommodated the 
debate on fragmentation and pluralism in international law from the very beginning. 
We look forward to accommodate and further this debate in the realm of ICL. 
 
 
EvS 
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